TWO WEEKS AFTER the beginning of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, the United Nations and Bush administration officials charged with the daunting task of shaping a new political order in that devastated country are still sorting through the invariably difficult options. The U.N. special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, began in-depth conversations with U.S. officials only last week; later this week he will begin talking with the Afghan exile groups spread across the world, from Rome and Cypress to Iran, Pakistan and beyond. Secretary of State Colin Powell and his staff are further ahead, but they, too, have yet to answer such questions as when and how a new government could be established for Afghanistan, and whether an international force will be needed to restore order. A lot depends on what happens in the few weeks remaining before the onset of winter, and on whether U.S. and opposition Afghan forces can defeat -- as opposed to merely disperse -- the leadership and troops of the Taliban regime. That's why one official uses the phrase "navigation by sight" to describe this latest international exercise in nation-building.
These complicated prospects are worrying some governments in Europe and Central Asia, and with reason. As opposition to the Afghan campaign rises, Pakistan is eager for the United States to end the bombing as quickly as possible. Humanitarian groups are growing more and more worried about their ability to deliver food to up to 6 million needy people inside Afghanistan this winter. The longer the war lasts, the harder it will be for the United States to maintain its coalition against al Qaeda and be effective in the war for public opinion in Muslim countries. But the United States probably cannot drive the Taliban from Kabul with air power and special forces alone, and the only alternative inside the country, the Northern Alliance, so far is struggling in an offensive against the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Even if it were to succeed in taking Kabul and other southern cities, the alliance might only provoke another round of fighting with the ethnic groups it excludes.
At best, Mr. Brahimi and other brokers may be able to cobble together an interim political coalition in the coming weeks that, with heavy support from the United Nations and a hastily assembled Afghan or international security force, might take power in Kabul and other key areas before winter. If Taliban resistance crumbles or there are defections of forces in the south, the Northern Alliance might succeed in taking over military control of most of the country, with political arrangements coming afterward. But it is entirely possible that creating an administration and clearing the Taliban out of the way for it will take considerably longer.
If that is the case, the United States will have to be prepared to stay the course, continuing military operations through the winter and resisting appeals for a "pause" that would allow the Taliban and al Qaeda to regroup. Suspending or slowing the military campaign will only postpone the day when the Taliban regime can be unseated, while the steady destruction of its forces should encourage agreement on a replacement. Though the course is not yet clear, the easiest and quickest way to resolve the Afghan political problem surely lies in continuing the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda, relentlessly.
2001 The Washington Post Company