The LJ is the 250-year-old traditional Afghan parliament of tribal, religious and ethnic leaders, which is the only legitimate authority that could form a new government and attract broad support from the people and the anti-Taliban factions. Many Taliban have secretly supported the LJ process, but have been unwilling to confront hardliners within the movement led by leader Mullah Omar. With the present crisis and the imminent collapse of the Taliban regime, these Taliban dissidents are now directly approaching LJ representatives. 
Zahir Shah has lived in Rome since 1973, when he was ousted in a coup by his cousin Mohammed Daud, who set up a Republic and made himself President. Zahir Shah ascended to the throne in 1933 after watching his father be assassinated by a student in Kabul. During Zahir Shah's reign, Afghanistan enjoyed peace and in the 1960s Kabul became a venue for Western hippies. Most Afghans look back to that period with enormous nostalgia. Zahir Shah has said he has no intentions to reconstitute the monarchy, rather his role would be unite all Afghan forces through the LJ process. 
On September 20 Zahir Shah issued an appeal "for the liberation of our homeland and people." His supporters in Pakistan and the Arab Gulf states say they are ready to act. "Hundreds of Taliban are ready to defect the moment the King gives an order for a national uprising," says a leading member of the LJ based in Pakistan. "We believe that the ground will soon be ready to hold a LJ inside Afghanistan with the help of international powers, the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference," he adds. 
Such Afghan forces must play a significant role as the U.S. plans its military strategy. U.S. forces will face major military difficulties in Afghanistan, where the terrain of high mountains and deserts is extreme, and Taliban-Arab forces are likely to break up into small, highly mobile guerrilla groups. There are few obvious targets and overexposure of U.S. forces could lead to a wider backlash by the fiercely nationalistic Afghans, who in the last two centuries have defeated British and Soviet invaders. 
It would be unwise for Washington to deploy ground troops to invade or occupy even a small part of Afghan territory for any period of time. U.S. special forces could occupy an airbase inside Afghanistan to facilitate operations, but bombing cities or even trying to occupy them would be hazardous and useless. 
Instead it would be prudent for the United States to provide air cover and other military aid to the anti-Taliban forces inside the country. Such action could encourage defections among Taliban forces. The Taliban need to know that there are Afghan forces on the ground to which they can defect - not the Americans. As the anti-Taliban forces take territory and cities, U.S. forces will need to provide massive humanitarian aid so that the population is protected by U.S. air cover and fed in the liberated areas. Local Taliban commanders still holding out would come under their people's pressure to surrender and thereby receive food. 
By supporting the LJ process, and encouraging all anti-Taliban Afghan factions to join it, the United States could set in motion a political process, which could result in the establishment of a stable post-Taliban political order, garnering support from all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups. But such a political process would need a long-term U.S. commitment, a U.S.-led consensus from the international community and intense dialogue with all of Afghanistan's neighbors, including Iran. 
The U.S. would also have to deal with its new ally Pakistan, which has supported the Taliban and which may try once again to foster a client regime in Kabul. Pakistan has to be convinced that any new government in Kabul will not pose a threat to Pakistan, and will still be heavily dependent on Pakistan for food, aid and trade. 
Thus, the United States has to construct a global alliance not just for the war, but also for the peace. Washington cannot do this alone. It needs the support of the United Nations and in particular the office of U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative to Afghanistan, whose successive chiefs have for the past 12 years been trying to bring peace to Afghanistan. The present UN Special Representative Fransesc Vendrell has said that this is a moment of acute crisis for the Afghan people, but also a moment of hope. UN efforts in the past have been stymied by the opposition of the Afghan factions and by Afghanistan's neighbors, particularly Pakistan. A major cause for past UN failure has been the lack of support from the international community.